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a partnership in things subservient only to the gross 
animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. 
It is a partnership in all science, a partnership in all 
art, a partnership in every virtue and in all perfection. 
As the ends of such a partnership cannot be obtained in 
many generations, it becomes a partnership not only be­
tween those who are living, but between those who are liv­
ing, those who are dead, and those who are to be born. 
Each contract of each particular state is but a clause in 
the great primeval contract nf. sociefvT" linki^ 
the lower with the higher natures, connecting the visible 
and invisible world, according to a fixed compact sanc­
tioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical 
and all moral natures each in their appointed place. This 
law is not subject to the will of those who, by an obli­
gation above them, and infinitely superior, are bound to 
submit their will to that law. The municipal corporations 
of that unii£firsRl kingdom are nofluOTally at iibe"rl:y, a't 
their^pi«a^re7 and on th¥Ir~speTrcri'a't4©ns 6f a contingent 
improvement, wholly to separate and tear asunder the bands 
ojf their subord^inate community, and to dissolve it into an 
unsocial, uncivil, unconnected chaos of elementary prin­
ciples. It is the first and sapremg necess.ity only, a 
necessity~TEat is not chosen, but chooses^ a necessity 
paramount to deliberation, that admits no discussion and 
demands no evidence, which alone can justify a 
anarchy. This necessity is no exception to the rule; be­
cause this necessity itself is a part^ too, of that moral 
and physical disposition of things to which man must be 
obedient by consent or force: but if that which is only 
submission to nec£tss4ty—shoulxi-be made the object of choice, 
thre law- is Nature is disobeyed, and the rebellious 
are outlawed, cast forth, and exiled;, from this world of 
reasaa^ and order^and peace, virtue, and frui tful 
penitence, into the antagonist world of madness, discord, 
vice, confusi and„ unavailing sorrow - * 
JeremyBen^aam (1748-1832) is the l^st Englishman with 
whom we shalT^deaX in this chapter. His life spanned the years 
from the Enlightenment almost up to the Victorian Age (1837-1901). 
His thoughts as well as his dates make him a useful transitional 
figure. 
* Reprinted from The Worl5;s o!f „ . . Edmund Burke (Boston: Little, 
Brown, and Company, 1865), Tfl, 244-245, 246, 248-252, 274T280, 
295-301, 311-313, 350-352, 359-360. The quotation in the intro­
duction is found on pp. 524-525. 
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In many ways Bentham was a product of the Enlightenment. 
The basis for his thought was nature or what was natural, as he 
interpreted—it, He believed that his pr?ncjples were seif-
evident, and that they could be understood by men of all cul-
tural b a c k g r o u n d s . F r o m his home, aptly called the Hermitage, 
he presented his ideas as a program, almost a blueprint for 
action, with the calm self-assurance of the eighteenth century 
aristocrat. 
And yet Bentham was not just an enlightener. He differed 
from the earlier thinkers in many ways. His interests' ^*»r*> 
more practical than theoretical. Instead of being completely 
critical of the past. he wished to retain what was good and 
improve on it. Instead of accepting' nature as~aireaay perfect, 
h~e~~wi shed ~tp perfect, it. Instead of emphasizing physical 
nature, he focused on human nature. But his reforming zeal was 
not directed toward the moral or religious, which had been John 
Wesley°s concern; nor did he accept Burke's more conservative 
interpretation of social reform. He rather applied the enthusi-
asm of Wesley to a program of enlightened snpial reform He 
even hoped that the newly formed Latin American republics would 
call upon him for plans to determine their social and political 
structures. In 1811 he offered his services to President James 
Madison, asking approval for his drawing up a new code of laws 
for the United States. 
During most of his life Bentham was known for his advocacy 
_o± prison reform. In 1784 Parliament inaugurated a program of 
deporting prisoners to Australia, which Bentham opposed with 
his own plan for their reformation. His plan, in the architec-
tural part of which he had the help of his brother, who had 
been an engineer in the service of Catherine the Great, was 
written in 1787. In 1791 it was published as Panopticon; or 
the Inspection. House: containing the idea of a new principle 
of construction applicable to any sort~oF"establishment, in 
wEich persons of any description are to be kept under inspec-
tion: and in particular to Penitentiary-houses, Prisons, Houses 
of industry, Workhouses, Poor Houses, Manufactories, Lazarettos, 
Hospitals, and Schoolsj with a plan of management adopted to the 
principle. . . . The plan jr*consjniction"oaTIe<l for a circular 
building in which isolated cells could all be inspected from one 
contXQ-l__pjrtR"' ti on It thus embodied for Bentham the 'uTttwxiv '"1'n" 
environmental control. The plan of management called for a con-
tractual arrangement between the operator and the government on 
the basis of enlightened self-interest. When quest longed about 
the possibility Q f some of-the inma* o g ro~^enting~their lr>aa„ ^ _f 
freedomT Bentham__repjjed tfhat happiness and not frauadom W a s what 
people sought.'""" He spent much of his own fortune in an abortive 
attempt to establish such a prison in England. With the help of 
friends, he recovered the money much later, but not until after 
he had been forced into serious financial straits, and after he 
had been thoroughly disillusioned with the people in power and 
the current form o_f goyernmjent,
 <z^rztJ^^y 
&[£A/Ll**&k0?s-e*'?ije*t'V 
a ^ ^ ^ f ^ / * ^ 2 ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' 
/ 2 w * * ^ ^ b <>Cthj/L&t>fi<& • 
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Bentham"s e m p h a s i s o n reform, plus the fact that he had 
been made a citizen"""o"i France T n 1792 along with Thomas Paine, 
did not throw him into the camp of the radicals ofJiis^j&axly 
year si The"~"3octrine of natural rights upon which they based 
*t1"*eir programs he viewed as subversive of good government. He 
deplored the writing of both the American Declaration of Inde-
pendence and the French Declaration of Rights. He saw in these 
a statement of rights such as could be turned against any con-
stitution with disastrous effects. This opinion was not, how-
ever, as a result of the events in France, as can be seen from 
the date of his major work (1789) , Bentham's more mcjjerate 
approach to reform came from something more profound than either 
"current events or current radicalism. It came-from a rethinking 
of Enlightenment ideas on both morals and epistemologv^^iirwhich"^ 
he had the good fortune to be preceded by some of the most,acute 
and critical minds of the eighteenth century, 
25~~~t^< 
Some of these critics started from the thoughts of Newton, 
and Locke and pushed these thoughts even further than they had./^**^*^ 
In the field of epistemology this led to the development of a 
group of thinkers who, along with Locke, are called the British 
Empiricists, Included are George Berkeley (1685-1753) and 
David Hume (1711-1776)„ In the field of ethics this same self-
criticism produced a number of different types of thought which 
attempted to solve the problem of how to harmonize man's egoism 
ant altruism. Such enlighteners as Adam Smith and Joseph Butler 
had thought that this relationship, like all other relations in 
nature, was completely automatic. 
Bishop George Jgerjseiey did not approach the problem of the 
nature and limits o f ^ u m a n ^ k j ^ as we"" 
would say today. He was greatly worried over the manners and 
morals, skepticism, materialism, and atheism of his times. 
While this did not prevent him from writing some of the most 
lucid and significant philosophy to come out of England, it did 
ipj^rier^_with his being completely objective about the opinions 
of those ^yith whom he disagreed We are, today, witnessing a 
revival of the study of Berkeley because of his emphasis on the 
importance of the human factor in both scientific and philosoph-
ical knowing. 
Berkeley pushed Locke's emphasis on experience one step 
further and came to the conclusion that the material substance, 
b o t h l : n d i v i d u a ] flnd g e n e r a l r w h i r l ] L o c k e h a d b e l i e v e d t o " b e 
there" as the cause of our sensations and support of the quali-
ties which resulted from these sensations, could nojLJ?.e experi-
enced or proven• All that we know of things individually or 
collectively was included in the qualities which we receive in 
our experience of them; and, to say that there must be some mat-
ter whose brownness and squareness we experience, was to make a 
gratuitous assumption. This argument led to the, further asser-
t^ ioji, of no small significance, that-hoth types of^-qualitigs, 
primary or measnrahie (squareness^ and- secondary or psychqlogi-
cal (brownnessX^depended equally upon the mind for their a
 / fo their . • 
v&tnte^—/244S***-*Z^e ^*^- /** ^ 
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existence- This latter argument upset what scientists since 
Galileo had assumed to be an obvious truth: that when they 
were dealing with mathematical measurements they were dealing 
with the "real" world. It was this sort of an upset which was 
welcomed by Berkeley. 
The result was, as he saw it, that the constituent ele-
ments of nature were minds and their immediate objects of per-
ception and thought. And, because minds were incapable of 
representing anything which was not idea, matter itself could 
only be the expression of mJjryfls, or <v>d. Nature thus became7 
for Berkeley \ "diyiqe""visual" language," in which experience was 
interpreted in.terms of signs rather than the Lockean sensa-
tions of things. This tyjae—of-4ibJLli?sophy, known as subjective 
idealisjn, differed, from the idealism of Plato, which had given 
an independent existence to the ideas or forms. For Berkeley 
ideas depended on minds, or ....Mind, and thus losjLJ*hfi' 1 ^ dejgendent 
Stat/aa..„whlch they had,._ia the thought 'oT"*FIatoTas well as the 
dependence o:,. sensation which they had for Locke, And for the 
bishop this line "of argument Meant that he had refuted skepti-
cism, disproven materialism, and proven the necessary existence 
of God, as well as laid a firm foundation for manners as.d morals. 
In this he had, like John Wesley, almost proven too much, 
for his philosophy lacked an a priori principle,by which one 
could distinguish between his various e x p e r i e n c e s ^ ^ § | g ^ . 
Such a principle later British moralists were to suggest by 
approaching experience from the side of morals rather than 
epistemology. And the remaining problem in the thought of Ber-
keley,, that of the relation between minds and Mind, had to wait 
for Hegel's attempt at a metaphysical solution. In the mean-
time, the line of British empirigism...had not yet run its full 
course, a development which waalto' be completed by David Hume, 
Hume pushed the same type of Enlightenment thinking on to 
what metaphysical elements were left in Berkeley's thought. As 
Berkeley had disproven the proof of matter, so Hume, with equal 
devastation,^jilgprjaafld the •yeigning proofs inr"35o£a mind and 
causality, No oae, he argued, could ever really see his mind, 
jhls own or anyone else's. WhflL±. ha did. g e e were merely some,. 
ideas which. ..were supposed to he "fln, the mind" as,- qualities... had 
heen suppp^md to he ZX& raB-^^eT'n 1* w a s 3US^ a s absurd logic-
ally to argue from idea to mind as it was to argue from idea to 
matter. Both were unproved and unprovable assumptions. But 
Berkeley,!s argument was not yet defeated. According to him our 
"i_deas jjngt of. nacessity^jdepend on minds or Mind, and therefore 
mind must exist. Hume 8s...analysis of the_idea of..necessity,,. If. 
accepted, completed hiss destruction of the, bishop's fchonghjjj 
He d i y ^ e d t h e idea of causality into Its three eonstit.u-
etjt parts! n^rrrTgpii.i ty amprpsginn, and necessity X4L_JEa&_easy 
to see things contiguous or touching ore another. It was also 
easy to see things succeeding or following one another. But 
^ece^s±J^^JSis&-JLnleMtXTely differentTproposition . Neither 
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experience nor reason seerned capable of establishing.,Ms aspect 
of causality, which~&Toire~~mSGLe possible one's saying that some-
thing "must" have happened, or that something "must" exist. 
Here again, as with his shattering proof of minds, H\une_jUd-_noj; 
deny the^gxjstence-jo-f- necessity, only that its existence cou 1 d 
not be proved by_snch means. 
Hume's destructive criticisms brought down upon him the 
charges that he was a skeptic, an atheist, and an unbeliever. 
If his personal life had been notoriously immoral, many critics 
would not have been above using this fact to discredit his 
philosophical arguments. Such was not the case. His life was 
an example of gentleness, humanity, and love of his fellow men. 
His friends, among whom were numbered Adam Smith and Rousseau, 
agreed upon calling him le bon David. 
The problem of his ske,p+j"•*°«i ho+hc'T0C"* gums h""igo1''. There 
were^times, he tells us, when it was better to lightheartedly 
forget such speculations and join one's friends for dinner. 
But, a more serious answer than this was needed. ^Since he_J>e-
lieved in the existence of things, minds, and the necessity 
whose proofs he had destroyed, Hume was forced to rethink his 
own approach to knowing. This he did in terms of what was, for 
him, a deeper interpretation of experience, one which gave man's 
feelings, or passions as he called them, the place of priority: 
"Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passionsV' Here, 
in the feelings, there seemed to be unshakable ground upon which 
to build. Startirfg here it was possitnle to reconstruct the"* 
pjrojgfs which he had destroyed, so that one could now give j££2&-
ons for peiievflpg in. the existence of thjrp;g g n H mjjMJs» And 
the relations which exist between them could be discovered in 
the connections that we have in our own experience of them as, 
for example, in our association of warmth with the rising sun. 
This association of ideas, as it came to be called, was further 
strengthened by habit and custom as a result of which men became 
accustomed to making such associations. Instead of having the 
ideas of things and their relations caused in his mind, the. .know-
ing subject was now seen by Hume as reading such ideas into his 
ejcpgrienoe from his own feelings. Thus, for example, the ele-
ment of necessity was brought back into the idea of causality 
by the subject as knower; but it was a very different kind of 
necessity. Whereas for Newton "must" had referred to a law of 
nature, for Hume it referred to a moral intention" something 
"must" be done, 
Hume thus linked epistemology and ethics in a radically new 
way, giving expression to his great concern for the latter. The 
feelings of pleasure and pain became, for him, standards of what 
was useful and nor lisnnii; and things were known to fre d^esi r-
able because they were desired. Further, usefulness became 
identified with what was usually called good. Such an inter-
pretation 6T~the tyood could be proven simply in terms of experi-
e n c e ^ no reference to revelation, any a priori reason, or intu-
ition was needed. Experience was sufficient. It spoke for 
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itself, giving men an adequate basis for knowing what they 
meant by good. Here was one of the major ideas which was +.g he 
brought injj*LJi 111 ISu3SSSSi^^^3SSSSXSm 
Hume pressed his argument even further, into the realm of 
speculative philosophy. On such a basis of knowjjag, selves, 
matter, and causality coulir"he"'reaa bacg i nto p~at«re
 T although 
never as absolutes or laws, and always as tentative and hypo-
thetical . But they were not so tentative as to keep Hume from 
one of the most cogent attacks on the supernatural element in 
miracles, in which he completely reduced the miraculous element 
to its subjective aspect. And, by analogy, jQod became—the 
Spjrit--animating>,.iha,wholfi..„w.oxld.„o.f„nature,„ as our own spirit 
animates our human bodies. 
This interpretation was also Hume's way of solving the 
problem of any possible clash between individualistic and col-
lective desires. These desires were naturally in harmony with 
each other. Nature operated, as Adam Smith taught, bY~~LLan, un-
seen hand." or as Butler "had written, it was "so perfectly co-
incident" as to bring about what Hume called a "happy occur-
rence" of egoism and altruism. Hume thus placed himself in 
line with the basic Enlightenment thought, while avoiding the 
extremes of those who argued either for man's basic selfish-
ness or for his basic unselfishness. 
However, this interpretation did not. compJLetely solve the 
problem. Humejjiacl, in the^TJTSir^place, destroyed the Enlight-
enment concept oiLjiature as it came from~~tne nanas joiOjpwton 
and Locke. This meant, secondly, that, he had left the ordinary 
man", With his desire for abSQlpfes f,o apply t9 pr-acticql qnes-
tions^ without anythi,ng.Jmt-.a..method of arriving at proximate 
answers. Such questions as Whose pleasure or pain? Whose util-
ity? "Ifnd Whose good? could not receive final answers. In the 
rough and tumble of the late eighteenth century something 
stronger seemed to be called for than a method which relied 
ultimately on such a happy concurrence. It was this need which 
brought forth both Bentham's utilitarianism and Kant's cate-
gorical imperative. 
Bentham's solution to this moral prohiem was utilitarian-
ism, in which he enlarged on Hume's ideas. His own contribu-
tion was such that he was called the father of utilitarianism 
and the Newton of legislation. In An Introduction to,, JAg^Prin^. 
ciples of Morals and Legislation (1T5"9) we can see nTs develop-
ment of this line Of thought afiti catch the (JTarg^+oristip idfias 
of utilitarianism; that everything is to be u m g e d in terms of 
utilijLy.; that utilitY *i*** +/*" H o H<**t*jjie" in terms of the great********"! 
liappiness of the p-reatest mimher ojf people; that the greatest 
happiiies's' principle can be expressed in terms of the most pleas-
ure_and the least pain: that it is nosffiTTHii Lu ciga^-what-^e 
galled a mora 1 arithmetic; ar^ d that Jthjaja ajaa BiBfatAs "ianrtl-"*"0" 
which" move people in the direction of utility thus defjjajed. 
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From such a summary it is possible to conclude that Ben-
tham had not yet completely resolved the problem of the clash 
between egoism and altruism. T h e m o t i v e upon which he builds 
is clearlj[_j5^1jyL^^ 
interest', while the end that he.seeks is just as cjearly altru-
istic or collective. He attempted to resolve the conflict bv 
means "of the s^nT^jons, which took the place of nature's happy 
concurHnceancl applied the pressure necessary to assure the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number from men's individual 
selfishness. These sanctions were four in number; the phys-
ical, ***""*" J""**1 lit*1 ra"1 > the moral, and the_-roligirous. since the 
favor or disfavor of God could not be readily ascertained, 
since the moral sanction turned out to be that of popular ap-
proval, and since the laws of nature were separate from those 
of morals, the m3Jpx„043jexaiiVda~4K>wjars left in the field of 
sanctions w e r e j h o s e of the stat,e and popular opinion. It was 
just these elements of social life which Bentham^rTshed to 
reform. Clearly something was needed to make Bentham*s util-
itarianism work; and it was this something which was the con-
tribution of John Stuart Mill, to be discussed in the follow-
ing chapter. 
T E 
f ^ l " 
Having proven his theory to his own satisfaction, however, 
Bentham went on to show that utilitx,was the only j"C!'M fic^ti^n 
"or the basic ideas of either the radicals or the conservatives. 
e factors of natural rights and of social contract based on 
these rights could, he argued, be verified only in terms of an 
appeal to their utility. The same was true of the conservative 
ideas about the importance of tradition, the constitution, 
history, and society. The only justification for these was also 
in terms of the same appeal to utility. 
It is evident that utilitarianism implied a differjgnjt^json 
ception of ethics from the one to which people ha"d beeiTaccus-. 
tomed. For it morals and ethics were no longer concerned with 
final or absolute values such as the Good, or the Right. The 
valu.ejvf a n act.s depended on their utility, their tendency To 
'prjoducg^ig^^ter happTness. Sucii utilitarian values could, at 
their best, never be anything more than a good, or a right. 
Nor were the usual ways of knowing values honored. Innate 
ideas, intuition.^or revelation were nn longer ademiate. The 
only ways of knowing utilitarian values were by means of experi-
ence as interpreted by the British Empiricists. If there were 
any primary or final value_for Bentham it was reform; and of 
reforTn~there could be no end. For such reasons as these Ben-
tham was not interested in developing any final ethical system, 
any more than a finished metaphysical system. It is in this 
change of interest that we can most clearly see the difference 
between Bentham on the one hand and Plato or Aquinas on the 
other. As morals became more and more a means of improving the 
human situation, and nothing.more, so philosophy became more 
and more a means or a method Of knowing, rather than the final 
risuly of that knowing. 
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There were other matters in the minds of his countrymen 
than Bentham's book in 1789. The excitement of the French 
Revolution and Napoleon served to focus English thought and 
energy on more immediate matters. The result was an almost 
complete neglect of Bentham until the very end of his life. He 
became more and more discouraged, despite the fact that his 
books were selling well in countries other than England. The 
fate of his Panopticon plan served only to deepen his discour-
agement . 
However, the signs of a new day were appearing, even be-
fore 1815. In 1807 a parliamentary candidate was elected from 
Bentham's own borough, a candidate who was not the choice of 
either the Torry or the Whig party. His election seemed an ex-
pression of the feeling of the people in general toward both 
parties, a feeling which Bentham had come to share. He was 
rapidly drawn into the planning which centered around this new 
candidate. Planning in this sense was something quite differ-
ent from the planning to which Bentham had been accustomed. A 
new period in his life opened up when he was sixty years of age. 
nnjri_ng this 3 «st. part of his life Bentham became the cen-
ter of a^group of reformersT called the"philosophical radicals. 
ATrfioiig"^ E*Hese were James Mill (1773-1836) and his son, John Stuart 
Mill (1806-1873). Under the influence of these men, who were 
more radical than he had been, Bentham's thoughts began_jto 
change^ Disappointed in the aristocraticleadership of the Ep-
lightenmenf Th a wav in which Burke had not been, Bentham 
emerged as a believer in the programl?l*j***"3*'*^^ , 
advocating, among other things, parliamentary reform. „_JThj3_Re-
form Bill-^f"1^3A--.wag-a.-distinct triumph for Bentham and his 
cohorts in the very last year of his life. 
Of the Principle of Utility 
I. Nature has placed mankind under the governance qf^lA ^ ^ ^«g^ 
l^wo^spyjgxgign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them /(_rT^A^^> 
aioje-.tn point ,nnt,
 rwhat W g y p h t . to...dof as well as to oe- f ~ T (//%**& 
thymine_wnat we shall do On the one hand the standard^>;:^!t*^-- lafife 
of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes a.r&f'**''' 
effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in^ 
all we do, in all we say, in all we think- every effort ^ * 
we can make to throw off our subjection, will serve but t&°9
 t ^ 
demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man may pretend to"* 
abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain sub- f 
ject to it all the while. The principle of utility recog-
nises this subjection, and assumes it for -The foundation 
of that system, the object of which is to rear the fabric 
of felicity by the hands of reason and of law. Systems 
which attempt to question it, deal in sounds instead of 
sense, in caprice instead of reason, in darkness instead 
of light. 
But enough of metaphor and declamation: it is not by 
such means that moral science is to be improved. 
II. The principle of utility is/the foundation of 
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the present work: it will be proper therefore at the 
outset to give an explicit and determinate account of 
what is meant by it. By the principle of u t i l i t y j s 
meant that principle which approves"or"disapproves of 
every action whatsoever» according to the tendency which 
it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness 
of the party whose interest is in question: or, what is 
the same thing in other words, to promote or to oppose 
that happiness. I say of every action whatsoever; and 
therefore not only of every action of a private individ-
ual, but of every measure of government. 
III. By utility is meant that property in any object, 
whereby it tends t42_jgroduce_ benefit"/ Advantage, pleasure, 
good, or happiness. (all this in the present case comes 
to the same thing) or (what comes again to the same thing) 
to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or un-
happiness to the party whose interest is considered: if 
that party be the community in general, then the happiness 
of the community: if a particular individual, then the 
happiness of that individual. 
IV. The interest of the community is one of the most 
general expressions that can occur in the phraseology of 
morals: no wonder that the meaning of it is often lost. 
When it has a meaning, it is this. The community is a fic-
titious feojfly, composed of the indiviaiiai~*persons who are 
considered as constituting as it were its members. The 
interest of the commnn-j^y then is what? — the "sum of 
the interests _qf the several? members who compose it. 
V . I t is in vain to talk of the interest of the 
community, without understanding what is the interest of 
the individual. A__iMng_is.-~sai<l-to promote the interest, 
or to be for the interest, of an individual, when it 
tends„.to_add to the~~sum total of his pleasures: or, what 
comes to the same thing, to diminish the sum total of his 
pains. 
VI. An action then may be said to be conformable to 
the principle of utility, or, for shortness sake, to util-
ity, (meaning with respect to the community at large) when 
the tendency it has to augment the happiness of the com-
munity is greater than any it has to diminish it. 
VII. A measure of government (which is but a particu-
lar kind of action, performed by a particular person or 
persons) may be said to be conformable to or dictated by 
the principle of utility, when in like manner the tendency 
which it has to augment the happiness of the community is 
greater than any which it has to diminish it. 
VIII. When an action, or in particular a measure of gov-
ernment, is supposed by a man to be conformable to the 
principle of utility, it may be convenient, for the pur-
poses of discourse, to imagine a kind of law or dictate, 
called a law or dictate of utility: and to speak of the 
action in question, as being conformable to such law or 
dictate. 
IX. A man may be said to be a partizan of the 
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principle of utility, when the approbation or disapproba-
tion he annexes to any action, or to any measure, is de-
termined by and proportioned to the tendency which he con-
ceives it to have to augment or to diminish the happiness 
of the community: or in other words, to its conformity or 
unconformity to the laws or dictates of utility. 
X. Of an action thjLL-i£L-xanJormable to the principle 
of utility^ng^may'"liJw"ays say either that it is one that 
ought TlcPbe done, or at least that it is not one that 
ougnT~aot t(*rPe" done. One may say also, that it is right 
it~should be'~done7~at least that it is wrong it should 
not be done: .that it is a right action; at least that it 
is not a wrong action. When thus interpreted, the words 
ought, and right and wrong, and others of that stamp, have 
a meaning: when otherwise, they have none. 
XI. Has the rectitude of this principle been ever 
formally contested? It should seem that it had, by those 
who have not known what they have been meaning. Is it 
susceptible of any direct proof? it should seem not: for 
that which is used to prove every thing else9 cannot it-
self be proved: a chain of proofs must have their com-
mencement somewhere. To give such proof is as impossible 
as it is needless, 
XII. Not that there is or ever has been that human 
creature breathing, however stupid or perverse, who has 
not on many, perhaps on most occasions of his life, de-
ferred to it. By the natural constitution of the human 
frame, on most occasions of their lives men in general 
embrace this principle, without thinking of it: if not 
for the ordering of their own actions, yet for the trying 
of their own actions, as well as of those of other men. 
There have been, at the same time, not many, perhaps, even 
of the most intelligent, who have been disposed to embrace 
it purely and without reserve. There are even few,who 
have not taken some occasion or other to quarrel with it, 
either on account of their not understanding always how to 
apply it, or on account of some prejudice or other which 
they were afraid to examine into, or could not bear to 
part with. For such is the stuff that man is made of: in 
principle and in practice, in a right track and in a wrong 
one, the rarest of all human qualities is consistency. 
XIII. When a man attempts to combat the principle of 
utility, it is with reasons drawn, without his being aware 
of it, from that very principle itself. His arguments, if 
they prove any thing, prove not that the principle is 
wrong, but that, according to the applications he supposes 
to be made of it, it is misapplied. Is it possible for a 
man to move the earth? Yes; but he must first find out 
another earth to stand upon, 
XIV. To disprove the propriety of it by arguments is im-
possible; but, from the causes that have been mentioned, 
or from some confused or partial view of it, a man may 
happen to be disposed not to relish it. Where this is 
the case, if he thinks the settling of his opinions on 
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such a subject worth the trouble, let him take the fol-
lowing steps, and at length, perhaps, he may come to 
reconcile himself to it. 
1. Let him settle with himself, whether he would wish 
to discard this principle altogether; if so, let him con-
sider what it is that all his reasonings (in matters of 
politics especially) can amount to? 
2. If he would, let him settle with himself, whether 
he would judge and act without any principle, or whether 
there is any other he would judge and act by? 
3. If there be, let him examine and satisfy himself 
whether the principle he thinks he has found is really any 
separate intelligible principle; or whether it be not a 
mere principle in words, a kind of phrase, which at bottom 
expresses neither more nor less than the mere averment of 
his own unfounded sentiments; that is, what in another 
person he might be apt to call caprice? 
4. If he is inclined to think that his own approba-
tion or disapprobation, annexed to the idea of an act, 
without any regard to its consequences, is a sufficient 
foundation for him to judge and act upon, let him ask 
himself whether his sentiment is to be a standard of right 
and wrong, with respect to every other man, or whether 
every man's sentiment has the same privilege of being a 
standard to itself? 
5. In the first case, let him ask himself whether his 
principle is not despotical, and hostile to all the rest 
of the human race? 
6. In the second case, whether it is not anarchial, 
and whether at this rate there are not as many different 
standards of right and wrong as there are men? and whether 
even to the same man, the same thing, which is right to-
day, may not (without the least change in its nature) be 
wrong to-morrow? and whether the same thing is not right 
and wrong in the same place at the same time? and in 
either case, whether all argument is not at an end? and 
whether, when two men have said, .-'"I like t h i s / and 'I 
don't like i t / they can (upon such a principle) have any 
thing more to say? 
7. If he should have said to himself, No: for that 
the sentiment which he proposes as a standard must be 
grounded on reflection, let him say on what particulars 
the reflection is to turn? if on particulars having rela-
tion to the utility of the act, then let him say whether 
this is not deserting his own principle, and borrowing 
assistance from that very one in opposition to which he 
sets it up: or if not on those particulars, on what 
other particulars? 
8. If he should be for compounding the matter, and 
adopting his own principle in part, and the principle of 
utility in part, let him say how far he will adopt it? 
9. When he has settled with himself where he will 
stop, then let him ask himself how he justifies to himself 
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the adopting it so far? and why he will not adopt it any 
farther? 
10, Admitting any other principle than the principle 
of utility to be a right principle, a principle that it 
is right for a man to pursue; admitting (what is not true) 
that the word right can have a meaning without reference 
to utility, let him say whether there is any such thing 
as a motive that a man can have to pursue the dictates of 
it: if there is, let him say what that motive is, and 
how it is to be distinguished from those which enforce 
the dictates of utility: if not, then lastly let him say 
what it is this other principle can be good for? 
Of the Four Sanctions or Sources 
of Pain and Pleasure "m 
I. It has been showir"that the happiness of the in-
jiij^djuals, of whomo a community is composed, that is their 
pleasures and their security, is the end anfl the smle en'l 
which the legislator ought toTiave in view: the sole 
standard, in conformity to which each individual ought, 
as far as depends upon the legislator, to be made to 
fashion his behaviour. But whether it be this or any 
thing else that is to be done, there is nothing by which 
a man can ultimately be made to do it, but either pain or 
pleasure. Having taken a general view of these two grand 
objects (viz. pleasure, and what comes to the same thing, 
immunity from pain) in the character of final causes; it 
will be necessary to take a view of pleasure and pain it-
self, in the character of efficient causes or means. 
11. The r g^axe-^ottr-dis tinguish'able sources, from 
which pleasure and pain are in use to flow: considered 
separately, they may be termed the phvgji ca/l - the polit' 
the moral. and the religious: and inasmuch as the^pieas-
"ures anT"pains_ieJ,onging t'o e_ach
 n f ±h.em. are capable of 
giving a binding force to any law or rule of conduct, they 
may all of them be termed sanctions. 
III. ]"f it be in the, present ljfe ; and from the ordi-
nary course of nature, not purposely modified by the inter-
position of the will of any human being, nor by any extra-
ordinary interposition of any superior invisible being, 
that the pleasure or the pain takes place or is expected, 
r*jTmay_ be said to issue from or to belong to the physical 
sanction. 
IV. If at the hands of a particular person or set of 
persons in the community, who under names correspondent to 
that of judge, are chosen for the particular purpose of 
dispensing it, according to the will of the sovereign or 
supreme ruling power in the state, it may be said to issue 
from the political sanction. 
V. If at the hands of such chance persons in the com-
munity , as~~the pltrty in question may happen in tne course 
of his life to have concerns with, according to each man's 
spontaneous disposition, and not according to any settled 
or concerted rule, it jnay be said to issue from the moral 
l/ut*-^ d^r&e*-^ 
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or popular sanction. 
* VI i Tf from the iinmediate^jiand of a superior invis-
ible being, either in the pr^e^T~~ITf*e", or" in a future, 
~*lt ml»""y"H&"e"™Tsaid to issue from the religious sanction. 
VII. Pleasures oj^'&l"ns~wnTch may" 5e~exp^tt>fi to 
issue from th.e_j3hysical, political or moral sanctions, 
must^ aXl,ja£Iihem be expected to toe experienced, if ever, 
""ija^^^^^e^e^t n.fq? jfrhose which may be expeCTe^~To~" 
issue from the religious sanction, may be expected to be 
eyperie*njcejL_either in the present life or'in a future. 
VIII. Those which can be experienced in the present 
life, can of course be no others than such as human nature 
in the course of the present life is susceptible of: and 
from each of these sources may flow all the pleasures or 
pains of which, in the course of the present life, human 
nature is susceptible. With regard to these then (with 
which alone we have in this place any concern) those of 
them which belong to any one of those sanctions, differ 
not ultimately in kind from those which belong to any one 
of the other three: the only difference there is among 
them lies in the circumstances that accompany their pro-
duction. A suffering Which befalls a man, J,n ±\\e natural 
and spontaneous courae^pXjLhings, shall be styled, for 
instance, a_calamity; in which case, if it be supposed to 
befall himT^tnrough any imprudence of his, it may be 
styled a punishment issuing from the physical sanction. 
N o w this same suffering, jf inflicted by the lawf will be 
what is commonly called a punishmeDji; if incurred for want 
5x~any -friendly"assistance, whafcCn'the misconduct, or 
supposed misconduct, of the sufferer has occasioned to be 
withholden, a punishment issuing from the moral sanction; 
if through the immediate interposition of a particular 
providence, a punishment issuing from the religious sanc-
tion. 
IX. A man's goods, or his person, are consumed by 
fire. If this happened to him by what is called an acci-
dent, it was a calamity: if by reason of his own imprud-
ence (for instance, from his neglecting to put his candle 
out) it may be styled a punishment of the physical sanc-
tion: if it happened to him by the sentence of the polit-
ical magistrate, a punishment belonging to the political 
sanction; that is, what is commonly called a punishment: 
if for want of any assistance which his neighbour withheld 
from him out of some dislike to his moral character, a 
punishment of the moral sanction: if by an immediate act 
of God's displeasure, manifested on account of some sin 
committed by him, or through any distraction of mind, oc-
casioned by the dread of such displeasure, a punishment 
of the religious sanction. 
X. As to such of the n X a a s w s and pains belonging 
to the religioiis._Aanction, as regard a future life, of 
whaf kind these i^ay he we nannot _Jc*uaw These lie not Open 
to our observation. During the present life they are 
matter oniy of mrpndtatjfiTi- and, whether that expectation 
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be derived from natural or revealed religion, the partic-
ular kind of pleasure or pain s if it be different from all 
those which lie open to o u r observation, is what we can 
have no idea of. The best ideas we can obtain of such 
pains and pleasures are altogether unliquidated in point 
of quality. In what other respects our ideas of them may 
be liquidated will be considered in another place. 
XI. Of these four sanctions the physical is alto-
gether, we may observe, the ground-work of the political 
and the moral: so is it also of the religious, in as far 
as the latter bears relation to the present life. It is 
included in each of those other three. This may operate 
in any case, (that is, any of the pains or pleasures be-
longing to it may operate) independently of them: none 
of them can operate but by means of this. In a word, the 
powers of nature may operate of themselves; but neither 
the magistrate, nor men at large, can operate, nor is God 
in the case in question supposed to operate, but through 
the powers of nature, 
XII. For these four objects, which in their nature 
have so much in common, it seemed of use to find a common 
name. It seemed of use, in the first place, for the con-
venience of giving a name to certain pleasures and pains, 
for which a name equally characteristic could hardly 
otherwise have been found: in the second place, for the 
sake of holding up the efficacy of certain moral forces, 
the influence of which is apt not to be sufficiently at-
tended to. noes the political sanction exert ?" influ-
ence over^tjaa--conduot -of..,.mank4ncr?' The poral
 r. the reli-
gious sanctions do so top. In every inch of his career 
a r e t h e operations of the political magistrate liable to 
be aided or impeded by these two foreign powers: who, 
one or other of them, or both, are sure to be either his 
rivals or his allies. Does it happen to him to leave 
them out in his calculations? he will be sure almost to 
find himself mistaken in the result. Of all this we 
shall find abundant proofs in the sequel of this work. 
It behoves him, therefore, to have them continually be-
fore his eyes; and that under such a name as exhibits the 
relation they bear to his own purposes and designs. 
>f a T.ot of pleasure or Pain, 
How to be Measured 
I. Pleasures then, and the ay pi, dance of pains, **^ ~e_
-
jthe ends wtrl^ *****~~-,pe legislator "**"** •»**» view? it behoves 
him therefore to understand their value. Pleasures and 
pains are the instruments he has to work with; it behoves 
him therefore to understand their force, which is again, 
in other words, their value. 
II. To a person considered by himself, the value of 
a pleasure or pain considered.-b.y~Jts.elf, will be greater 
dD^less, according to the fourfollowing circumstances: 
T~. i t s intensity. 3, Its certainty or uncertainty, 
2. Its duration. 4. Its propinquity or remoteness. 
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III. These are the circumstances which are to be con-
sidered in estimating a pleasure or a pain considered 
each of them by itself. But when the value of any pleas-
ure or pain is considered for the purpose of estimating 
the tendency of any act by which it is produced, there 
are two, other circumstances to be taken into the account; 
these are. 
" 57 Its fecundity, or the chance it has of being fol-
lowed bv sensations oiLthe same kind: that is, pleasures, 
if it be a pleasure: p a i n s ^ T ~ 3 f _ b - e a Pain. 
6. Its purity, or th Q "rTTa*nr"p it ham nf Qgjj being fol-
lowed by sensations of the opposite kind: that is, pains, 
if it be a pleasure: pleasures, if it be a pain. 
These two last, however, are in strictness scarcely to 
be deemed properties of the pleasure or the pain itself; 
they are not, therefore, in strictness to be taken into 
the account of the value of that pleasure or that pain. 
They are in strictness to be deemed properties only of 
the act, or other event, by which such pleasure or pain 
has been produced; and accordingly are only to be taken 
into the account of the tendency of such act or such event. 
IV. To a number of persons, with reference to each of 
whom the value of a pleasure or a pain is considered, it 
will be greater or less, according to seven circumstances: 
to wit, the six preceding ones; viz. 
1. Its intensity. 
Its duration. 2. 
3, 
4, 
5, 
6, 
Its certainTy or uncertainty. 
Its propinquity or remoteness, 
Its fecundity. 
Its purity. 
And one other; to wit: 
7. Its extent; that is, the number of persons to whom 
•*•£ extendsl Q% Tin other words) who are affected by it. 
V^ To take an exact account then of the general ten-
dency of any act, by which the interests of a community 
are affected, proceed as follows. Begin with any one per-
son of those whose interests seem most immediately to be 
affected by it: and take an account, 
1. Of the value of each distinguishable pleasure which 
appears to be produced by it in the first instance. 
2. Of the value of each pain which appears to be pro-
duced by it in the first instance. 
3. Of the value of each pleasure which appears to be 
produced by it after the first. This constitutes the fecund-
ity of the firs"~~pTeasure and the impurity Of the firsT" 
pain. 
4,. Of the value of each pain; Whicheappears to be pro-
duced by it: after therfirst;" This* constItutesTthe fecund-
ity, of the first pain, and the impurity of the]first 
pleasure. 
5. Sum.UP all the values^of all the pipgg^yog on tho 
one_side, and those of all the pains on the other. "he^, 
balance, i f ^ L x b j ^ b n z h e side o f p l e a s u r e , will give the 
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good tendency pf the act upon the whole, with respect to 
the interests o f that, IndivldMal person; if on the side 
of pain, the bad tendency of it upon the whole. 
6. Take an account of the number of persons whose in-
terests appear to be concerned; and repeat the above pro-
cess with respect to each. Sum up the numbers expressive 
of the degrees of good tendency, which the act has, with 
respect to each individual, in regard to whom the ten-
dency of it is good upon the whole: do this again with 
respect to each individual, in regard to whom the ten-
dency of it is good upon the whole: do this again with 
respect to each individual, in regard to whom the ten-
dency of it is bad upon the whole. Take the balance; 
which, if on the side of pleasure, will give the general 
good tendency of the act, with respect to the total num-
ber or community of individuals concerned; if on the side 
of pain, the general evil tendency, with respect to the 
same community. 
VI. It is not to be expected that this process should 
be strictly pursued previously to every moral judgment, 
or to every legislative or judicial operation. It may, 
however, be always kept in view: and as near as the pro-
cess actually pursued on these occasions approaches to it, 
so near will such process approach to the character of an 
exact one. 
VII. The same process is alike applicable to pleasure 
and pain, in whatever shape they appear: and by whatever 
denomination they are distinguished: to pleasure, whether 
it be called good (which is properly the cause or instru-
ment of pleasure) or profit (which is distant pleasure, or 
the cause or instrument of distant pleasure,) or conveni-
ence, or advantage, benefit, emolument, happiness, and so 
forth: to pain, whether it be called evi"T"" (which corres-
ponds to good) or mischief, or inconvenience, or disad-
vantage, or loss, or unhappiness, and so forth. 
VIII. Nor is this a novel and unwarranted, any more 
than it i s *a ?ice iqs.fi theory. Tn all this there Is nrrhhing 
but what the practice of mankind, wheresoever they have a 
clear view of their own interest, is perfectly conformable 
to. An article_of_ property 9 an estate in land, for in-
stanceJL_is valuable, on what account? On account-jof—the 
pleasures of aUl—J&4«da„j»ilii^h it enab~~.es
 a man to produce 
and what comes to the same thing the pains of all kinds 
which it enables him to avert. But the value of such an 
article of property is universally understood to rise or 
fall according to the length or shortness of the time 
which a man has in it: theccertainty or uncertainty of 
its coming into possession: and the nearness or remote-
ness of the time at which, if at all, it is to come into 
possession. As to the intensity of the pleasures wht<?_h a 
man may derive from, it r-tht« io nosier thought of, because 
it depends^iipon the use which each particular person may 
come to make of it; which cannot be estimated till the 
particular pleasures he may come to derive from it, or 
XII p. 53 
the particular pains he may come to exclude by means of it, 
are brought to view. For the same reason, neither does 
he think of the fecundity or purity of these pleasures. 
Thus much for pleasure and pain, happiness and unhappi-
ness, in general. We come now to consider the several 
particular kinds of pain and pleasure. * 
